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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
Case No. 990583-CA 
v. : 
DENNIS CRAIG SMITH, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from two convictions for theft, one a second degree felony and 
the other a third degree felony, and one conviction for attempted theft, a class A 
misdemeanor. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-2(e) 
(1996). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
I. Was there sufficient evidence concerning the value of the videotapes stolen 
on April 10, 1998, to support defendant's conviction on Count II for theft of 
property worth at least $1,000? 
A jury conviction is reversed for insufficient evidence only when the evidence and 
all reasonable inferences therefrom, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, are 
"sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he [or 
she] was convicted." State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 343 (Utah 1997). 
II. Was there sufficient evidence to support the trial court's restitution order of 
$34,755 where the evidence showed that defendant stole 993 videotapes 
valued at $35 each? 
This Court reverses a restitution order for insufficient evidence only if "'the clear 
weight of [the] evidence contradicts the trial court's [ruling].'" State v. McBride, 940 P.2d 
539, 541 (Utah App. 1997) (quoting State v. Gurr, 904 P.2d 238, 242 (Utah App. 1995)) 
(second set of brackets added). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following relevant statutory provisions are attached at Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 (Supp. 1998); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (Supp. 1998). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by amended information with two counts of second degree 
felony theft of property with a value of or exceeding $5,000, and one count of attempted 
theft of property with a value of or exceeding $1,000, a class A misdemeanor (R. 1-3). 
After a two-day trial, a jury found defendant guilty of second degree felony theft on the 
first count; the lesser-included offense of third degree felony theft on the second count; 
and attempted theft as charged on the. third count (R. 65-67; R. 101:45-46). 
In a final judgment entered May 27,1999, the trial court sentenced defendant to 
one-to-fifteen years on the second degree felony; zero-to-five years on the third degree 
felony; and 365 days in jail on the class A misdemeanor (R. 79). Execution of these 
sentences was stayed, and defendant was ordered to serve 120 days in jail and three years' 
2 
probation (R. 79; R. 102:10). An initial restitution hearing was set for July 6, 1999 (R. 
79; R. 102:10). 
On June 24, 1999, defendant filed a notice of appeal challenging the trial court's 
May 27, 1999 order (R. 91-92). 
On August 17, 1999, the trial court held a restitution hearing and ordered that 
defendant pay restitution in the amount of $34,755 (R. 95; R. 103:32). However, the trial 
court has yet to issue a final restitution order. Defendant has filed no new notice of 
appeal since the trial court announced its restitution ruling. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
During the year and a half that defendant worked at Sight and Sound, a videotape 
wholesaler, the business sustained some $800,000 in lost inventory (R. 98:140-41). 
During his first six months there, defendant pawned 893 new videotapes at pawn shops 
across Salt Lake County (R. 100:134). He was later caught on two occasions stealing or 
attempting to steal cases of new videotapes from the company's dock area (R. 98:120-26; 
R. 100:42-54, 58). 
Sight and Sound is "a wholesale distribution company for home videos" (R. 
98:82). It distributes home movies to retailers such as Albertsons, Smith's, and 
Blockbuster and handles some $45 million in videos annually (R. 98:82-84). 
Before defendant began working at Sight and Sound, the company would conduct 
a manual inventory count almost every quarter (R. 98:134). At that time, the warehouse 
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would close for a few days, manually count all of its inventory, compare those numbers to 
the inventory recorded on the computer, and make any adjustments necessary to balance 
those figures (R. 98:84). Any overages in the manual counts were generally caused when 
movies previously thought to be lost—and which, therefore, had been deducted from the 
computer inventory—were found during the manual inventory check (R. 98:139). 
An inventory check completed in July 1996 showed a net overage of over $30,000 
of product (R. 98:138). An inventory check completed September 1996 showed a net 
overage of over $5,000 of product (R. 98:139). Because of the rush associated with 
Christmas, no inventory check was completed in December 1996 (R. 98:139-40). 
During this time, Renn Monson was employed as an assistant warehouse manager 
with the company (R. 98:87). He also held the cleaning contract for the warehouse (R. 
98:87). Defendant began helping Monson with the cleaning in January 1997 (R. 100:138, 
157). He was hired by Sight and Sound as a warehouse worker on June 16, 1997 (R. 
98:86). 
The first manual inventory conducted after defendant had been hired as a cleaner 
showed a deficit of $79,000 worth of product (R. 98:140). The next, in July 1997, 
showed a deficit of $53,000 (R. 98:140). The December 1997 check showed a deficit of 
$412,000 (R. 98:140). The February 1998 check showed a deficit of $208,000 (R. 
98:140). The April 5,1998, check showed a deficit of $42,000 (R. 98:140). 
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On January 7, 1997, defendant pawned 134 videotapes at Premier Pawn in Salt 
Lake City (St. Exh. 19, admitted at R. 100:259). The next day, he pawned fifty tapes at 
Witzels (Id.). On January 28, 1997, defendant pawned sixty-six videos at three different 
pawn shops in a space of about thirty minutes (Id.). The next day, he pawned 
nineteen videos at a fourth pawn shop (Id.). On February 15, 1997, he pawned twenty-
five at yet another (Id.). On February 21, 1997, defendant pawned 149 videos at three 
different pawn shops (Id.). On February 22, 1997, he pawned 199 videos at three other 
pawn shops (Id.). Finally, on four different days between March 1 and June 25, 1997, 
defendant pawned 251 videos at Hy & Mike's. (St. Exh. 15; R. 100:99-102). 
Thus, between January 7, 1997 and June 25,1997, defendant pawned a total of 893 
videos at various pawn shops across Salt Lake County (Id.). Most of the pawned movies 
were "brand new," still "in the wrapper" (R. 100:99-102). Titles included Jurassic Park, 
Heat, and Casino, sometimes up to fifteen copies each (R. 100:102-03). 
At the beginning of April 1998, Sight and Sound hired Richard Forbes, a private 
investigator, to investigate possible theft at the company (R. 98:117). On April 10, 1998, 
Forbes positioned his car to conduct surveillance of the warehouse after the employees 
had gone home (R. 100:42). At approximately 6:30 p.m. that night, Forbes saw defendant 
enter the premises and park his four-door gold Plymouth outside the six-foot high fence 
that surrounded Sight and Sound's docking area (R. 98:116; 100:44-47). Shortly 
thereafter, two passengers exited the car (R. 100:46). One scaled the fence, went directly 
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to the docking ramp, pulled out a case of videotapes, carried it to the fence, and threw it 
over to the other passenger waiting outside the fence, who then placed the box on the 
back seat of defendant's car (R. 100:47). The process was repeated with a second box, 
after which the first passenger re-scaled the fence, both passengers re-entered the car, and 
the car left (R. 100:47). Forbes recorded the whole event on a hand-held video recorder 
(R. 48-53). 
Based on Forbes' April 10 surveillance and without informing its employees, Sight 
and Sound installed surveillance cameras on the inside and outside of the building to 
record any suspicious conduct taking place in the docking area (R. 100:53). 
On April 14, 1998, Forbes again positioned his vehicle to conduct after-hours 
surveillance of Sight and Sound's docking area (R. 100:54). At approximately 5:40 p.m., 
after almost all the employees had left, Forbes observed defendant carry a case of 
videotapes out of the warehouse, place it underneath the ramp in the docking area, and 
then go back into the warehouse (R. 100:54, 243). After notifying the local police, 
Forbes walked over to the ramp, looked at the case, and recorded the case's serial number 
(R. 100:54-55, 57). The case appeared unopened and sealed with its original tape (R. 
100:57). 
At approximately 8:00 p.m. that night, defendant, alone this time, returned to the 
docking area in his gold Plymouth, parked his car near the dock, exited the car, and 
approached the steps of the dock (R. 100:60, 243). However, before defendant could 
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climb over the gate, Murray City police officers stopped and questioned him (R. 100:60). 
Defendant told the officers that he was merely an employee of the company checking 
things out after hours (R. 100:88). He was released once the officers established that he 
did not have any videotapes in his possession at the time (R. 100:89). The events were 
recorded on Sight and Sound's surveillance cameras (R. 98:122-26). 
The next morning, defendant arrived to work at 8:00 a.m., two hours prior to the 
beginning of his shift (R. 98:160, 168). It was unusual for him to be there that early (R. 
98:168). However, as defendant himself testified, he wanted to retrieve the box from 
under the ramp before anyone else saw it (R. 100:250). Sight and Sound's surveillance 
cameras recorded defendant retrieving the box (which had gotten wet overnight), 
covering it with plastic, and returning it to the warehouse (R. 98:126-131). 
The box was later seized by Sight and Sound officials (R. 98:144). It contained 
fifty new "L.A. Confidential" tapes with a retail value of approximately $100 each (R. 
98:146,186). 
While defendant was working as a janitor only (before he was hired on June 16, 
1997), he had no authority to take any videos from the premises of Sight and Sound (R. 
98:86). After June 16, 1997, he had permission, just like any other employee, only to take 
screeners returned to the warehouse by Sight and Sound salespersons (R. 98:99).l No 
1
 "Screeners" are videotapes provided to Sight and Sound salespeople free of 
charge so that they can preview the products they will be selling (R. 98:88-93; R. 100:31). 
Salespeople may keep any of the screeners they receive (R. 98:99-100). Screeners they 
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employee was allowed to take new or defective tapes from the warehouse (R. 98:88, 115, 
179). Generally, defective tapes were either returned to the manufacturer for a full refund 
or were sold to a company on the east coast for parts (R. 98:95-97, 100-02, 108; R. 
100:153). Thus, defective tapes were as valuable to Sight and Sound as were non-
defective tapes (R. 98:96-97). 
Sight and Sound officials and Forbes confronted defendant on April 15, 1998 (R. 
100:162). At that time, defendant admitted that he had been taking "cases of video tapes" 
from the company for several months (R. 100:64). However, defendant insisted that he 
had taken only damaged tapes which he would repair at home (R. 100:80). At trial, 
defendant testified that the boxes he had taken on April 10 and 14 were boxes of 
screeners and defective tapes that were actually given to him a few days earlier by a 
supervisor (R. 100:209-10, 237-38).2 
On approximately April 17, defendant was interviewed by Detective Jeff Anderson 
(R. 100:116). Defendant initially denied that he had pawned any videos (R. 100:116). He 
also contended that the videos taken on April 10 were defective tapes of no value (R. 
100:113, 139). He later admitted that he had in fact pawned at least 893 Sight and Sound 
don't want, however, are either placed in a common area for employees to take or placed 
in the company's library for employee checkout (R. 98:99-100). Sight and Sound 
receives, on average, 120 to 130 screeners per month (R. 98:100). Because they are free 
to the company and are not meant to be sold, no inventory is kept for screeners (R. 
98:114). 
2The supervisor testified on defendant's behalf at trial but did not corroborate his 
story (R. 98:150-89). 
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tapes at local pawn shops, but claimed that all those tapes had been defective (R. 100:134, 
147). A subsequent search of defendant's home and storage unit revealed fourteen brand 
new copies of the movie, Touch, that had been taken from Sight and Sound (R. 100:141). 
Defendant stopped working for Sight and Sound on April 15, 1998 (R. 100:25). 
The inventory check covering the period from April 6, 1998 to June 30, 1998, showed a 
deficit of $6,000 worth of product (R. 98:141). The next check, conducted at the end of 
September 1998, showed a surplus of $25,000 (R. 98:141). The one conducted in January 
1999 showed a surplus of $10,000 (R. 98:141). 
Sight and Sound paid anywhere from $10 to $80 for each of its videos, depending 
on the type of movie involved (R. 100:151, 153). Thus, the average cost of a video was 
between $35 and $40 (R. 100:150). However, most of the videos lost by Sight and Sound 
between January 1997 and June 1998 were new, higher-priced releases (R. 100:27, 152-
53). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The evidence presented at trial—that defendant stole 100 videotapes on April 10, 
1998, each costing Sight and Sound an average of $35—is sufficient to support 
defendant's conviction on count II for stealing property worth at least $1,000. 
This Court lacks jurisdiction to consider defendant's restitution claim because no 
final restitution order has yet been entered, and because defendant has yet to file a timely 
notice of appeal concerning the trial court's ruling. Alternatively, this Court should 
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refuse to consider defendant's claim because he did not preserve it below and because he 
has failed to marshal the evidence on appeal. In any case, the undisputed evidence 
presented at defendant's restitution hearing supports the trial court's order. 
ARGUMENT 
I. EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANT STOLE 100 VIDEOTAPES 
WHOSE AVERAGE VALUE WAS $35 EACH IS SUFFICIENT TO 
SUPPORT THE JURY'S CONVICTION OF DEFENDANT ON 
COUNT II. 
Defendant claims that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of third 
degree felony theft on count II because "the State failed to prove what was contained in 
the two boxes" stolen by defendant on April 10, 1998. Aplt. Br. at 13-14.3 Thus, on 
appeal, defendant does not dispute that he stole two videotape boxes from Sight and 
Sound on April 10,1998. Rather, he asserts that the State failed to present any evidence 
from which to conclude that those boxes contained videotapes worth at least $1000. See 
Aplt. Br. at 13-14. 
A. This Court should not reach defendant's claim because he failed to 
preserve it below. 
As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised on 
appeal." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 11,10 P.3d 346. This preservation rule "applies 
3Section 76-6-412 of the Utah Code provides that a person convicted of theft of 
property with a value of that "is or exceeds $1,000 but is less than $5,000" is guilty of a 
third degree felony. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412(l)(b) (Supp. 1998). 
10 
to every claim, including [sufficiency claims], unless a defendant can demonstrate that 
'exceptional circumstances' exist or 'plain error' occurred." Id. at ffl[l 1, 14. 
In this case, defendant did not raise his insufficient evidence claim below. 
Furthermore, he does not argue "exceptional circumstances" or "plain error" on appeal. 
Consequently, this Court should not reach his claim. See State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 
1229 n.5 (Utah 1995) (rejecting defendant's claim that State was required to establish 
certain mens rea at preliminary hearing where defendant did not raise the claim below: 
"Because Pledger does not argue that 'exceptional circumstances' or 'plain error' justifies 
a review of the issue, we decline to consider it on appeal.") 
B. This Court should not reach defendant's claim because he has not 
provided an adequate record. 
"Parties claiming error below and seeking appellate review have the duty and 
responsibility to support their allegations with an adequate record." State v. Wetzel, 868 
P.2d 64, 67 (Utah 1993). "Thus, the appellant has the burden of providing the reviewing 
court with an adequate record on appeal to prove his allegations." Call v. City of West 
Jordan, 788 P.2d 1049, 1052 (Utah App. 1990) (citing Broberg v. Hess, 782 P.2d 198, 
201 (Utah App. 1989)); accord State v. Wulffenstein, 657 P.2d 289, 293 (Utah 1982). 
Absent an adequate record on appeal, the reviewing court will necessarily assume the 
regularity of the proceedings below. See Jolivet v. Cook, 784 P.2d 1148, 1150 (Utah 
1989); State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688, 699 (Utah App. 1995). 
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Here, a number of surveillance tapes that recorded the April 10 theft and the April 
14 attempted theft were admitted into evidence at trial (St. Exh. 7-10; R. 98:120-32; 
R. 100:48-53). A statement regarding his involvement written by defendant on April 15, 
1998, was also admitted (St. Exh. 14; R. 67-68). However, defendant has not included 
any of these exhibits in his record on appeal. Without them, the record is inadequate to 
review defendant's sufficiency claim, and this Court should refuse to consider it. 
C. Defendant's claim fails on the merits. 
Circumstantial evidence alone is sufficient to support a conviction for theft. See 
State v. Lyman, 966 P.2d 278, 281 (Utah App. 1998); see also State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 
337, 344 (Utah 1997); State v. Nickles, 728 P.2d 123, 127 (Utah 1986); State v. Watts, 
675 P.2d 566, 569 (Utah 1983). 
Furthermore, "the mere existence of conflicting evidence . . . does not warrant 
reversal." State v. Warden, 813 P.2d 1146, 1150 (Utah 1991). "The jury, not the 
appellate court, weighs the evidence and assesses witness credibility; so long as some 
evidence and reasonable inferences support the jury's findings, we will not disturb them." 
State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738 (Utah App. 1990) (citing State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 
342, 345 (Utah 1985)). 
Thus, a jury conviction is reversed for insufficient evidence only when the 
evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom, viewed in the light most favorable to 
the verdict, are "sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds 
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must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of 
which he [or she] was convicted." State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 343 (Utah 1997); see 
also State v. Pedersen, 802 P.2d 1328, 1330 (Utah App. 1991). The same standard 
applies to a jury's property value determination. Zellers v. United States, 682 A.2d 1118, 
1121 (D.C. App. 1996) (holding jury's determination concerning the value of stolen 
property will be overturned only if "the jury's verdict was based on surmise or 
conjecture"); United States v. Thweatt, 433 F.2d 1226, 126-27 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
Here, the evidence presented to the jury, and the reasonable inferences therefrom, 
support the conclusion that defendant stole over $1000 in videotapes from Sight and 
Sound on April 10, 1998. 
Defendant stole 100 videotapes on April 10. First, defendant admits that each of 
the boxes taken by him and his accomplices on April 10, 1998, was designed to hold fifty 
videotapes (R. 100:211, 214). Second, the accomplice retrieving the boxes from the ramp 
retrieved them one at a time (R. 100:42, 45, 47). From these facts, the jury could 
reasonably infer that the boxes were too full and heavy to easily carry together. 
Third, defendant testified that both the April 10 and the April 15 boxes contained 
videotapes that his supervisor had given him a few days earlier (R. 100:209, 237-38). 
Defendant explained that he received all those tapes at the same time and that they were 
either screeners or defective tapes (R. 100:209,237-38). From this, the jury could 
reasonably infer that the boxes taken on April 10 contained the same types of videos 
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contained in the box defendant tried to take on April 14. However, when examined, the 
April 14 box did not contain screeners or defective videos but rather, contained fifty new 
L.A. Confidential videotapes (R. 98:146, 186). From this, the jury could reasonably 
conclude that the April 10 boxes contained similarly valuable videotapes. 
Fourth, on April 15, defendant admitted that he had been taking "cases of video 
tapes" from the company for several months (R. 100:64). Because defendant's 
confession came right after Sight and Sound officials confronted him with the full box of 
L.A. Confidential tapes, the jury could reasonably conclude that defendant was admitting 
to having previously taken similarly full boxes. 
Finally, between April 5, 1998 and June 30, 1998, Sight and Sound registered a 
loss of $6,000 in inventory (R. 98:141). If the average cost of Sight and Sound's 
videotapes was $35, as Sight and Sound's sales manager testified (R. 100:150), that loss 
amounted to a loss of approximately 171 videotapes. Yet, Sight and Sound surveillance 
cameras, which remained in place for several weeks after April 14, recorded no other 
completed thefts (R. 100:26-27). From this, the jury could reasonably conclude that the 
majority of those tapes were in the boxes taken on April 10. 
This evidence is sufficient to conclude that defendant stole 100 videotapes on 
April 10, 1998. 
The value of those tapes exceeded $1000. When establishing the value of stolen 
property, the test to be applied is "the market value t e s t . . . . That value is the highest 
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price, estimated in terms of money, for which the property would have sold in the open 
market at [the] time [of the crime] and in that locality." State v. Logan, 563 P.2d 811,813 
(Utah 1977); see also State v. Kimbel, 620 P.2d 515, 518. (Utah 1980); State v. White, 
152 P.2d 80, 82 (Utah 1944); State v. Ott, 763 P.2d 810, 813 (Utah App.1988). 
However, the purchase price of the property—that amount paid by the victim—"'is 
competent evidence of fair market value . . . where the goods are so new, and thus, have 
depreciated in value so insubstantially, as to allow a reasonable inference that the 
purchase price is comparable to the fair market value.'" State v. Lyman, 966 P.2d 278, 
283 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting People v. Paris, 511 P.2d 893, 894 (Colo. 1973) (en 
banc)). 
Here, the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom support the 
conclusion that the videos stolen on April 10 were worth at least $1000. First, as 
discussed above, Sight and Sound registered a loss of $6000 in inventory between the 
dates of April 5 and June 30, 1998 (R. 98:141). However, neither the private 
investigator's surveillance nor the surveillance cameras installed after defendant stole the 
two cases of videotapes on April 10 revealed any other thefts during that period (R. 
100:26-27, 83). From this, the jury could reasonably conclude that the boxes defendant 
stole on April 10 were the sole cause of Sight and Sound's loss. This evidence alone is 
sufficient to support the jury's verdict that the videos defendant stole on April 10 were 
worth at least $1000. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412(1 )(b). 
15 
In addition, however, the State also presented evidence both that most of Sight and 
Sound's missing inventory consisted of new and high-priced videotapes and that these 
were the types of videos defendant stole, despite his claim that he took only screeners and 
defective tapes (R. 100:27). First, defendant's own witness, on cross-examination, 
admitted that no employee ever took fifty screeners home in one day (R. 98:171). In 
addition, numerous witnesses testified that defendant had no authority to take home 
defective tapes (R. 98:88, 115-16, 179). 
Moreover, of the 893 videotapes that defendant pawned from January 1997 
through June 1997, some ninety-five percent of those were new releases, including high-
priced releases such as Jurassic Park, Heat, and Casino, sometimes up to fifteen copies 
of each title, still in their plastic sheathing (R. 100:102-03). 
Further, on April 14, defendant was caught on surveillance cameras attempting to 
steal another box of Sight and Sound videotapes (R. 98:144). He took a box out of the 
warehouse and placed it under the ramp (R. 98:121-26). After having been stopped by 
police when he tried to retrieve the box later that night, defendant arrived at work early 
the next morning to return the box to the warehouse (R. 98:127-32). Defendant claimed 
that this box and the April 10 boxes were full of only screeners and defective tapes (R. 
100:209, 237-38). However, the box defendant returned on April 15 was actually a full 
box of brand-new videotapes (R. 98:144). A jury could reasonably infer that, having lied 
about the April 15 box, defendant was also lying when he claimed the April 10 boxes 
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contained only screeners and defective tapes. It could further conclude that the Apnl 10 
boxes in fact contained new tapes. The fact that approximately fourteen new Sight and 
Sound copies of the movie, Touch, were subsequently found in defendant's apartment and 
storage unit lends further support to the jury's conclusions (R. 100:141). 
Moreover, even if defendant had successfully stolen defective tapes against 
company policy, those tapes were as valuable to Sight and Sound as were the non-
defective ones (R. 98:96-9). Thus, even if the April 10 boxes did contain only defective 
tapes, the value of those tapes would be the same as if he had stolen new ones. 
Finally, the State presented evidence that the price Sight and Sound paid for its 
videos ranged from $10 to $70, with the average cost about $35 to $40 (R. 100:150). One 
hundred videotapes at a cost of $35 each would be worth $3,500. 
All this evidence supports the jury's conclusion that defendant stole over $1000 
worth of property on April 10. This is not a case, then, where the jury "had no basis upon 
which to conclude that the value of the equipment on the date of theft equaled or 
exceeded $1000." Lyman, 966 P.2d at 284 (finding evidence insufficient where 
equipment was several years old and "[t]he State presented no evidence concerning the 
condition of the equipment at the time of the theft or the rate at which the equipment 
would depreciate"). 
Consequently, defendant's insufficiency claim fails. 
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II. EVEN IF DEFENDANT'S RESTITUTION CLAIM WERE 
PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT, WHICH IT IS NOT, THE 
EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER. 
Defendant asserts that "the State failed to offer sufficient evidence to support the 
trial court's Order of Restitution." Aplt. Br. at 15. Specifically, defendant asserts that 
each figure upon which the trial court relied—the number of tapes defendant pawned 
(893), the number of tapes contained in the two boxes taken on April 10 (100), and the 
average value of the tapes distributed by Sight and Sound ($35)—"is entirely unsupported 
by any evidence." Aplt. Br. at 16. 
A. This Court lacks jurisdiction to consider defendant's 
claim because no final restitution order has been entered 
and no proper notice of appeal has been filed. 
An unsigned minute entry is not a final judgment for purposes of appeal. State v. 
Jiminez, 938 P.2d 264, 264 (Utah 1997); Ron Shepherd Ins., Inc. v. Shields, 882 P.2d 
650, 653 (Utah 1994). "Absent a final order, the appellate court lacks jurisdiction and 
must dismiss the appeal" Kurth v. Wiarda, 1999 UT App. 153 f 5, 981 P.2d 417; see 
also Jiminez, 938 P.2d at 264; Ron Shepherd Ins., Inc., 882 P.2d at 553. 
In Issue B of his opening brief, defendant challenges a restitution order noted 
only in an unsigned minute entry (R. 95). See Aplt. Br. at 15-17. No formal, written, 
or signed restitution order has yet been entered. Hence, this Court lacks jurisdiction to 
consider defendant's claim at this time. Cf. State v. Davis, 721 P.2d 894, 896 (Utah 
1986) (per curiam) (holding court lacked jurisdiction to consider restitution claims 
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where "[t]he only record of [the restitution] proceeding is an unsigned minute entry 
which is not appealable"). 
Moreover, even if a final order existed, this Court still lacks jurisdiction over 
defendant's claim because he has not yet filed a proper notice of appeal under Rule 4, 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Rule 4(a) provides that, "[i]n a case in which an appeal is permitted as a matter 
of r igh t . . . , the notice of appeal . . . shall be filed . . . within 30 days after the entry of 
the judgment or order appealed from." Utah R. App. P. 4(a). Rule 4(c) then provides 
that "[e]xcept as provided in paragraph (b) of this rule [inapplicable here], a notice of 
appeal filed after the announcement of a decision, judgement, or order but before the 
entry of the judgment or order of the trial court shall be treated as filed after such entry 
and on the day thereof." Utah R. App. P. 4(c). 
In this case, defendant's notice of appeal was not filed after the trial court 
announced its restitution ruling or "within 30 days after the entry of the [restitution] 
order appealed from," since no such order has yet been entered. Utah R. App. P. 4(a). 
Thus, under rule 4, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider defendant's claim. 
B. This Court should decline to reach defendant's claim 
because he failed to preserve it below. 
"As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised on 
appeal." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 11, 10 P.3d 346. This preservation rule "applies 
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to every claim, including [sufficiency claims], unless a defendant can demonstrate that 
'exceptional circumstances' exist or 'plain error' occurred." Id. at ffl|l 1, 14. 
In this case, defendant did not raise his insufficient evidence claim below. 
Furthermore, he does not claim "exceptional circumstances" or "plain error" on appeal. 
Consequently, this Court should not reach his claim. See State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 
1229 n.5 (Utah 1995) ("Because Pledger does not argue that 'exceptional circumstances' 
or 'plain error' justifies a review of the issue, we decline to consider it on appeal.") 
C. The evidence supports the trial court's findings that 
defendant stole a total of 993 videotapes from Sight and 
Sound and that the average cost of each videotape was 
$35. 
"To successfully challenge the sufficiency of the evidence [supporting the trial 
court's restitution order], appellant 'must demonstrate that the clear weight of [the] 
evidence contradicts the trial court's verdict.'" State v. McBride, 940 P.2d 539, 541 (Utah 
App. 1997) (quoting State v. Gurr, 904 P.2d 238, 242 (Utah App. 1995)) (first set of 
brackets added). However, because defendant did not raise this claim below, he can raise 
it here only for plain error. Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at f 17. To succeed on his claim, then, 
defendant must show that "the evidentiary defect was so obvious and fundamental" that 
the trial court should have found it sua sponte. Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at f 18. Moreover, 
defendant cannot assert plain error if he himself led the trial court into making that error. 
See State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76,131, 12 P.3d 92. 
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Section 76-3-20 l(4)(a)(i) provides that "[w]hen a person is convicted of criminal 
activity that has resulted in pecuniary damages,... the court shall order that the defendant 
make restitution to victims of crimes." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20 l(4)(a)(i) (Supp. 1998). 
Section 76-3-201(1 )(c) defines "pecuniary damages" as "all special damages . . which a 
person could recover against the defendant in a civil action arising out of the facts or 
events constituting the defendant's criminal activities." Id. § 76-3-201(10(c). Under 
these provisions, the State need only establish the amount of restitution by a 
preponderance of the evidence. Cf. State v. Houston, 2000 UT App 242, f 12, 9 P.3d 188 
("An award of pecuniary damages as restitution for crime is justified because proof of a 
defendant's guilty beyond a reasonable doubt necessarily meets the preponderance of the 
evidence standard establishing civil liability."). Here, the evidence was sufficient to meet 
that burden. 
As the trial court noted during defendant's restitution hearing, the trial court based 
its restitution order not only on the evidence provided at defendant's restitution hearing, 
but also on the evidence presented during defendant's trial (R. 103:28). 
At trial, the State presented evidence that defendant had pawned 893 Sight and 
Sound videos at pawn shops across Salt Lake County within six months of beginning to 
work at Sight and Sound (R. 100:12, 1236-37, 259). Although some of those videos were 
possibly screeners, most of the movies pawned were "brand new," with titles including 
Jurassic Park, Heat, and Casino, sometimes up to fifteen copies of each (R. 100:99-103). 
21 
Then, on April 10, 1998, defendant was captured on videotape stealing two cases of tapes 
from Sight and Sound. As discussed above, see pp. 10-17 supra, the evidence at trial 
supported the conclusion that those boxes contained a total of 100 brand new videotapes. 
Finally, Sight and Sound official Ross Johnson testified both at trial and during the 
restitution hearing, that Sight and Sound paid from about $10 to about $70 for each of its 
videos, making the average cost somewhere between $35 and $40 a tape (R. 100:27, 150-
53; R. 103:4). 
This evidence, the trial court's recitation of which at the restitution hearing was 
accepted without objection (R. 103:8-9, 16-17, 20, 26), is more than sufficient to support 
the trial court's findings that defendant stole a total of 993 videos from Sight and Sound 
(the 893 that he pawned and the 100 that he stole on April 10), and that the average cost 
of these videos to Sight and Sound was at least $35. Thus, defendant cannot establish 
either that "the clear weight of [the] evidence contradicts the trial court's [ruling]," 
McBride, 940 P.2d at 541, or that there exists an "evidentiary defect... so obvious and 
fundament" that the trial court should have found it sua sponte, Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at 
1|18. 
Moreover, even if this Court considers defendant's claim that some of the 
videotapes he pawned were valueless screeners, the trial court's use of $35 as the average 
cost of a video, as opposed to $40 (the higher average figure given by Mr. Johnson), more 
than accounted for the valueless screeners. 
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Nine hundred ninety-three tapes, at an average cost of $40, are worth a total of 
$39,720. Nine hundred ninety-three tapes, at an average cost of $35, are worth a total of 
$34,755. By choosing to use the $35 figure over the $40 figure, the trial court lessened 
defendant's potential restitution burden by $4965 ($39,720 - $34,755). 
Pawn shop owner Mark Reich testified that no more than five percent of the videos 
defendant pawned were screeners (R. 100:103). Five percent of 893 tapes is 44.65 or 
forty-five tapes. Even if those tapes were subtracted from the 993 total upon which the 
trial court calculated restitution, thereby leaving a total number of valuable tapes taken at 
948, the total amount of restitution, had the trial court chosen to use the average value of 
$40 instead of $35, would have been $37,920—still some $3,000 more that the trial court 
actually ordered defendant to pay. 
Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in using the figures it did to 
calculate the amount of restitution defendant should pay. See State v. Schweitzer, 943 
P.2d 649, 653 (Utah App. 1997) (holding appellate court will not disturb trial court's 
restitution order "unless it exceeds that prescribed by law or [the trial court] otherwise 
abused its discretion"). 
Finally, even if the trial court did err in calculating restitution, defendant invited 
such error by affirmatively adopting the numbers upon which the trial court's calculation 
was based. The "invited error" doctrine provides that "a party cannot take advantage of 
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an error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into committing the error." 
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993). 
Here, defense counsel, in clarifying the trial court's identification of the relevant 
videos, referred to uthe 893 that we've already talked about and the 100—the 100 in the 
two boxes" (R. 103:9). Later, when the trial court reiterated the number of tapes to which 
defendant had been connected, "893, 18 and then two boxes of 50" (R. 103:20), counsel 
responded, "Each, right" (R. 103:20).4 Still later, she indicated that "[defendant] did 
pawn the 893 tapes, there was the 100, the two—the boxes of 50, the two boxes" (R. 
103:26). 
Moreover, counsel did not dispute the evidence concerning the average value of 
the tapes stolen (R. 103:8-9). Counsel's "only dispute" was, apparently, "what of the 893" 
videos pawned were screeners (R. 103:16-17, 20). 
To the extent counsel's statements constitute invited error, defendant cannot now 
claim plain error on appeal. See State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1284-85 (Utah 1989) 
(refusing to reach issue under "invited error" doctrine where defendant was "alleging on 
appeal prejudicial error which was affirmatively, knowingly, and intentionally waived at 
the sentencing proceeding"). 
4The eighteen (18) videos were those new Touch videos found in defendant's 
actual possession upon search of his home and storage unit (R. 103:14, 18). Because 
those videos were repossessed by Sight and Sound, they were not included in the trial 
court's restitution calculation (R. 103:19-20). 
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For all of these reasons, defendant's claim fails. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State asks this Court to affirm defendant's 
convictions and sentences. 
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION NOT REQUESTED 
Because this case presents no complex or novel questions, the State does not 
request that it be set for oral argument or that a published opinion issue. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED /^February 2001 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
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Assistant Attorney General 
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Addendum A 
76-6-412 CRIMINAL CODE 86 
76-6-412. Theft — Classification of offenses — Action for 
treble damages. 
(1) Theft of property and services as provided in this chapter shall be 
punishable: 
(a) as a felony of the second degree if the: 
(i) value of the property or services is or exceeds $5,000; 
(ii) property stolen is a firearm or an operable motor vehicle; 
(iii) actor is armed with a dangerous weapon, as defined in Section 
76-1-601, at the time of the theft; or 
(iv) property is stolen from the person of another; 
(b) as a felony of the third degree if: 
(i) the value of the property or services is or exceeds $1,000 but is 
less than $5,000; 
(ii) the actor has been twice before convicted of theft, any robbery, 
or any burglary with intent to commit theft; or 
(iii) in a case not amounting to a second-degree felony, the property 
taken is a stallion, mare, colt, gelding, cow, heifer, steer, ox, bull, calf, 
sheep, goat, mule, jack, jenny, swine, poultry, or a fur-bearing animal 
raised for commercial purposes; 
(c) as a class A misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen is or 
exceeds $300 but is less than $1,000; or 
(d) as a class B misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen is less 
than $300. 
(2) Any person who violates Subsection 76-6-408(1) or Section 76-6-413, or 
commits theft of property described in Subsection 76-6-412(l)(bXiii), is civilly 
liable for three times the amount of actual damages, if any sustained by the 
plaintiff, and for costs of suit and reasonable attorneys' fees. 
PART 2 
SENTENCING 
76-3-201. Sentences or combination of sentences allowed 
— Civil penalties — Restitution — Hearing — 
Definitions. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Conviction" includes a: 
(i) judgment of guilt; and 
(ii) plea of guilty. 
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is 
convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits 
responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an admission of 
committing the criminal conduct. 
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general 
damages, which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil 
action arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's 
criminal activities and includes the money equivalent of property taken, 
destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including earnings 
and medical expenses. 
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary 
damages to a victim, including the accrual of interest from the time of 
sentencing, insured damages, and payment for expenses to a governmen-
tal entity for extradition or transportation and as further defined in 
Subsection (4Xc). 
(e) (i) "Victim" means any person whom the court determines has 
suffered pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal 
activities. 
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's 
criminal activities. 
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a 
person convicted of an offense to any one of the following sentences or 
combination of them: 
(a) to pay a fine; 
(b) to removal or disqualification from public or private office; 
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law; 
(d) to imprisonment; 
(e) to life imprisonment; 
(f) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison without parole; or 
(g) to death. 
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(3) (a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law 
to: 
(i) forfeit property; 
(ii) dissolve a corporation; 
(iii) suspend or cancel a license; 
(iv) permit removal of a person from office; 
(v) cite for contempt; or 
(vi) impose any other civil penalty, 
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence. 
(4) (a) (i) When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted 
in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may 
impose, the court shall order that the defendant make restitution to 
victims of crime as provided in this subsection, or for conduct for 
which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea 
agreement. For purposes of restitution, a victim has the meaning as 
defined in Subsection (lXe). 
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court 
shall follow the criteria and procedures as provided in Subsections 
(4X0 and (4Xd). 
(iii) If the court finds the defendant owes restitution, the clerk of 
the court shall enter an order of complete restitution as defined in 
Subsection (8Xb) on the civil judgment docket and provide notice of 
the order to the parties. 
(iv) The order is considered a legal judgment enforceable under the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and the person in whose favor the 
restitution order is entered may seek enforcement of the restitution 
order in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In 
addition, the Department of Corrections may, on behalf of the person 
in whose favor the restitution order is entered, enforce the restitution 
order as judgment creditor under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(v) If the defendant fails to obey a court order for payment of 
restitution and the victim or department elects to pursue collection of 
the order by civil process, the victim shall be entitled to recover 
reasonable attorney^ fees. 
(vi) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a lien when re-
corded in a judgment docket and shall have the same effect and is 
subject to the same rules as a judgment for money in a civil action. 
Interest shall accrue on the amount ordered from the time of sentenc-
ing. 
(vii) The Department of Corrections shall make rules permitting 
the restitution payments to be credited to principal first and the 
remainder of payments credited to interest in accordance with Title 
63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
(b) (i) If a defendant has been extradited to this state under Title 77, 
Chapter 30, Extradition, to resolve pending criminal charges and is 
convicted of criminal activity in the county to which he has been 
returned, the court may, in addition to any other sentence it may 
impose, order that the defendant make restitution for costs expended 
by any governmental entity for the extradition. 
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court 
shall consider the criteria in Subsection (4Xc). 
(c) In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete 
restitution and court-ordered restitution. 
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(0 Complete restitution means the restitution necessary to com-
pensate a victim for all losses caused by the defendant. 
(ii) Court-ordered restitution means the restitution the court hav-
ing criminal jurisdiction orders the defendant to pay as a part of the 
criminal sentence at the time of sentencing. 
dii) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be 
determined as provided in Subsection (8). 
(d) (i) If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inap-
propriate under this subsection, the court shall make the reasons for 
the decision a part of the court record. 
(ii) In any civil action brought by a victim to enforce the judgment, 
the defendant shall be entitled to offset any amounts that have been 
paid as part of court-ordered restitution to the victim. 
(iii) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a lien when re-
corded in a judgment docket and shall have the same effect and is 
subject to the same rules as a judgment for money in a civil action. 
Interest shall accrue on the amount ordered from the time of sentenc-
ing. 
(iv) The Department of Corrections shall make rules permitting the 
restitution payments to be credited to principal first and the remain-
der of payments credited to interest in accordance with Title 63, 
Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
(e) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of 
the restitution, the court shall at the time of sentencing allow the 
defendant a full hearing on the issue. 
(5) (a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court 
shall order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental transporta-
tion expenses if the defendant was: 
(i) transported pursuant to court order from one county to another 
within the state at governmental expense to resolve pending criminal 
charges; 
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C misdemeanor; and 
(iii) convicted of a crime. 
(b) The court may not order the defendant to pay restitution of 
governmental transportation expenses if any of the following apply: 
(i) the defendant is charged with an infraction or on a subsequent 
failure to appear a warrant is issued for an infraction; or 
(ii) the defendant was not transported pursuant to a court order. 
(c) (i) Restitution of governmental transportation expenses under Sub-
section (5XaXi) shall be calculated according to the following schedule: 
(A) $75 for up to 100 miles a defendant is transported; 
(B) $125 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is transported; 
and 
(C) $250 for 200 miles or more a defendant is transported. 
(ii) The schedule of restitution under Subsection (5XcXi) applies to 
each defendant transported regardless of the number of defendants 
actually transported in a single trip. 
(6) (a) If a statute under which the defendant was convicted mandates that 
one of three stated minimum terms shall be imposed, the court shall order 
imposition of the term of middle severity unless there are circumstances in 
aggravation or mitigation of the crime. 
(b) Prior to or at the time of sentencing, either party may submit a 
statement identifying circumstances in aggravation or mitigation or 
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presenting additional facts. If the statement is in writing, it shall be filed 
with the court and served on the opposing party at least four days prior to 
the time set for sentencing. 
(c) In determining whether there are circumstances that justify impo-
sition of the highest or lowest term, the court may consider the record in 
the case, the probation officer's report, other reports, including reports 
received under Section 76-3-404, statements in aggravation or mitigation 
submitted by the prosecution or the defendant, and any further evidence 
introduced at the sentencing hearing. 
(d) The court shall set forth on the record the facts supporting and 
reasons for imposing the upper or lower term. 
(e) The court in determining a just sentence shall consider sentencing 
guidelines regarding aggravation and mitigation promulgated by the 
Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice. 
(7) If during the commission of a crime described as child kidnaping, rape of 
a child, object rape of a child, sodomy upon a child, or sexual abuse of a child, 
the defendant causes substantial bodily injury to the child, and if the charge is 
set forth in the information or indictment and admitted by the defendant, or 
found true by a judge or jury at trial, the defendant shall be sentenced to the 
highest minimum term in state prison. This subsection takes precedence over 
any conflicting provision of law. 
(8) (a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offense 
shall include any criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the 
sentencing court or to which the defendant agrees to pay restitution. A 
victim of an offense, that involves as an element a scheme, a conspiracy, or 
a pattern of criminal activity, includes any person directly harmed by the 
defendant's criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or 
pattern. 
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for complete 
restitution, the court shall consider all relevant facts, including: 
(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in damage 
to or loss or destruction of property of a victim of the offense; 
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services 
and devices relating to physical, psychiatric, and psychological care, 
including nonmedical care and treatment rendered in accordance with 
a method of healing recognized by the law of the place of treatment; 
the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and rehabili-
tation; and the income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if the 
offense resulted in bodily injury to a victim; and 
(iii) the cost of necessary funeral and related services if the offense 
resulted in the death of a victim. 
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for court-
ordered restitution, the court shall consider the factors listed in Subsec-
tion (8Kb) and: 
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that 
payment of restitution will impose, with regard to the other obliga-
tions of the defendant; 
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment 
basis or on other conditions to be fixed by the court; 
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of 
restitution and the method of payment; and 
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines make restitu-
tion inappropriate. 
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(d) The court may decline to make an order or may defer entering an 
order of restitution if the court determines that the complication and 
prolongation of the sentencing process, as a result of considering an order 
of restitution under this subsection, substantially outweighs the need to 
provide restitution to the victim. 
